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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, insurance companies nationwide began to
incorporate what came to be known as "pollution exclusions" in
commercial general liability policies.' The exclusions served a
distinct and reasonable purpose-to protect against insurer liability
for the costs of mitigating excessive environmental damage caused
f The author is a second-year student at William Mitchell College of Law
and is currently employed as ajudicial law clerk in Saint Croix County, Wisconsin.
He thanks his brother and best friend, Erik Hofer, for the near decade of
employment in construction, which helped him recognize the practical
importance of the subject matter.
1. Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, What Constitutes "Pollutant,"
"Contaminant," "Irritant, " or "Waste" Within Meaning of Absolute or Total Pollution
Exclusion in Liability Insurance Policy, 98 A.L.R. 5th 193, § 2 (2002).
1528
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by the insured . Over time, the exclusions were modified by court
interpretation and the evermore expansive language in the policies
themselves,3 a process that continues today.
In Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wolters,4 the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered the scope of an absolute
pollution exclusion in a commercial general liability policy.5 The
court held that the exclusion barred coverage for damage caused
by carbon monoxide joisoning resulting from the improper
installation of a furnace. This holding raises a number of issues.
First, while acknowledging that pollution exclusions have been
subject to a great deal of litigation in the past, the court held that
there was no ambiguity in the Wolters pollution exclusion.7 This
finding is counterintuitive and will result in even more litigation. As
will be demonstrated through both case law and a hypothetical-
but real-world-example, the status of absolute pollution
exclusions under current Minnesota law effectively gives insurers an
incentive to litigate against their own clients.8
Second, the court's holding results in an undue expansion of
the absolute pollution exclusion. This is problematic on a number
of levels, not the least of which is that those insured under such
policies often create the very foundations upon which our
economies and homes are built. This Note will demonstrate that
this expansion may harm those companies that have taken the
responsible action of securing liability insurance.'0 In some
instances, the risks of having the insurance may be greater than
avoiding it altogether.''
Finally, the court ignored the standard of the reasonable
insured." This exacerbates the disparities of bargaining power
2. John V. Garaffa & Michael W. Goodin, The Absolute Pollution Exclusion:
Pollution and Fungus, Wet Rot, Dy Rot, and Bacteria, 50 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J.
105, 105-06 (2014).
3. See Thomas K Bick & Lisa G. Youngblood, The Pollution Exclusion Saga
Continues: Does It Apply to Indoor Releases?, 5 S.C. ENvrL. L.J. 119, 124 (1997).
4. 831 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. 2013).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 636-37.
7. Id. at 637.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. See infra Part IV.B.
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. See Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 634-39.
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inherent in insurance policies.' 3 Insurers write the policies; insurers
price the policies; insurers sell the policies. Now the insurers get to
interpret the policies as well, without regard for what the
purchasers reasonably expect the policies to cover. 4 This is in
ironic contrast to the court's supposed "non-technical, plain-
meaning" interpretation, as the court has now held that insurers
are more equipped to determine definitions based on common
language than the insured.
5
This Note examines each of the preceding issues and
concludes that the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in not
adopting the majority interpretation of absolute pollution
exclusions. 6 This Note will demonstrate that, despite several
decades of rewriting and reinterpretation, '7 most courts still hold
pollution exclusions to bar coverage only for harm caused by
"traditional environmental pollutants."
This Note further suggests that a new way to interpret absolute
pollution exclusions was available to the court; ' Judge Richard
Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had proposed this
new interpretation more than a year before the court decided
Wolters. While such a change may disappoint insurers, it would be
13. A central tenet of contract law is that the party that maintains the
dominant position in negotiating the contract must be required, in the event of a
dispute, to bow to the reasonable understanding of the more submissive party. See
id. at 636.
14. As the court alluded to, it is easy to confuse the standard of the
reasonable insured with the reasonable expectations doctrine. See id. at 634. The
former is explained infra Part II.B of this Note, whereas the reasonable
expectations doctrine is primarily concerned with whether the exclusion is
"hidden" within the contract by some means. Id.
15. Id. at 637; see infra Part IV.C.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See generally 22 BdrITON D. WEIMER ET AL., MINNESOTA PRACTICE:
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12:21 (2d ed. 2010) (broadly describing the
evolution of pollution exclusions in Minnesota).
18. See Bick & Youngblood, supra note 3, at 121. Although "traditional
environmental pollutants" can be defined in a number of ways, they are generally
limited to substances which cause significant and long-lasting damage to the
environment when released. See, e.g., Scottsdale Indem. Co. v. Vill. of Crestwood,
673 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2012); Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester
Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 1992); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v.
City of Pittsburg, Kan., 768 F. Supp. 1463, 1470 (D. Kan. 1991), affd sub nom. Pa.
Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburg, Kan., 987 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1993).
19. See infra Part IV.C.
20. See Crestwood, 673 F.3d at 717.
1530 [Vol. 41:4
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fairer to those who purchase the policies and would benefit society
at large. In the interest of Minnesota businesses, in devotion to age-
old rules of interpretation, and in the name of common sense, the
Minnesota Supreme Court must revisit this topic at its first
opportunity.
II. HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. The Development of Pollution Exclusions
Pollution exclusions began to appear in general liability
insurance policies during the 1970s,21 and the earliest versions were
22
known as "qualified" pollution exclusions. In the 1980s, the
exclusions were significantly broadened;23 these new clauses, such
as that at issue in Wolters,24 were often termed "absolute" pollution
15exclusions .
5
21. E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through. the
Looking Glass, 74 GEO. LJ. 1237, 1239-40 (1986).
22. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the "Absolute"
Exclusion in Context and in Accord with Its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT &
INS. L.J. 1, 14 (1998). The earliest pollution exclusions were considered to be
"qualified" because they did cover pollutant-related damages when incurred
suddenly, accidentally, or unexpectedly. Id. at 1 n.1. Bick and Youngblood also
state that:
The standard form sudden and accidental pollution exclusion states:
This insurance does not apply ... to Bodily Injury or Property Damage
arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke,
vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases,
waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or
upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water, but
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or
escape is sudden and accidental.
Bick &Youngblood, supra note 3, at 123 (quoting BARRYR. OSTRAGER&THOMASR.
NEWMAN, HANDBOOKON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 10.02(e) (1995)).
23. See Bick & Youngblood, supra note 3, at 124 ("After extensive litigation
over the scope of the sudden and accidental pollution exclusion, the [Insurance
Service Office] introduced a new version of the exclusion, the absolute pollution
exclusion. This exclusion, or a variation on it, is found in most policies issued after
1986."); Stempel, supra note 22, at 2-3.
24. See Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628, 631-32
(Minn. 2013).
25. See Bick & Youngblood, supra note 3, at 124. The revised clauses did not
provide coverage for pollutant-related damages even when such damages occurred
under conditions for which coverage would have been restored under the earlier
"qualified" pollution exclusions. See id. at 120. The absolute pollution exclusions
4
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Absolute pollution exclusions have prompted a great deal of
26
litigation over the course of the past three decades. Generally, the
cases revolve around whether or not the exclusions, or particular
terms within the exclusions, are ambiguous.27 The clauses
themselves differ to a minimal extent,28 but a jurisdictional split as
29to the presence of ambiguity in the term "pollutant" has arisen.
The primary reason that insurers progressed from qualified
exclusions to absolute exclusions is of particular importance: they
reasonably sought to protect themselves from the extensive costs of
environmental litigation and large-scale environmental cleanup
projects.3 O
generally come in one of two forms:
The primary standard form absolute pollution exclusion states:
This insurance does not apply to
(f)(1) Bodily Injury or Property Damage arising out of the actual,
alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
pollutants at or from premises you own, rent or occupy.
"Pollutants" is typically defined as:
any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste
includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
Counsel should be aware, however, that a second, less prevalent, but
nonetheless standard [Insurance Service Office]-issued exclusion is
worded slightly, but critically, differently. This second exclusion reads
as follows:
"This insurance does not apply:
(1) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge,
dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste material or other irritants,
contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any
water course or body of water, whether or not such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden or accidental."
Id. at 124-25 (quoting OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 22).
26. Id. at 120.
27. See, e.g., Scottsdale Indem. Co. v. Vill. of Crestwood, 673 F.3d 715, 717
(7th Cir. 2012) (discussing the literal reading of the policy language).
28. Bick & Youngblood, supra note 3, at 123-25.
29. See id. at 131-32 (discussing how different courts have treated the
definition of "pollution").
30. See Crestwood, 673 F.3d at 718 ("[I] t was the passage in 1980 of CERCLA
(Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq.), the federal toxic-waste statute, and the threat and later the
reality of government-ordered cleanup costs imposed by CERCLA, that prompted
the industry to adopt the current, broader exclusion." (citing MacKinnon v. Truck
1532 [Vol. 41:4
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B. The Basics of the Rules
A slim majority of jurisdictions hold that absolute pollution
exclusions only apply to traditional environmental pollution, and
thus enforce coverage where the contaminant is released indoors.
This interpretation pays heed to the very reason that commercial
general liability policies are often purchased: to protect against
negligent actions. Such actions may well include avoidable
mistakes, like the error at issue in Wolters,32 but the human tendency
to err is precisely what liability insurance is for.
The minority rule is to interpret the exclusions broadly so as to
include substances that virtually no layperson would ever construe
as a "pollutant. ,13 Indeed, even some of the foremost legal thinkers
of our time have difficulty seeing how the minority justifies its
expansive definition of "pollutant."34  The minority rule also
broadens the exclusions to bar coverage for the release of
numerous substances indoors-whether the substance is a
traditional environmental pollutant or not. As the facts of Wolters
demonstrate, 6 such a broad interpretation undermines the very
reason for liability policies in the first place.
One of the more notable aspects of the jurisdictional split is
that courts of both persuasions have often reached their
contradictory conclusions while applying substantially similar rules• . 37
of contract interpretation. A few of these rules are as follows:38
words are defined according to their most common usage; an
Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1210-11 (Cal. 2003); Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So.
2d 119, 126 (La. 2000); Kent Farms, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 998 P.2d 292, 295
(Wash. 2000))).
31. 22 WEIMERETAL., supra note 17.
32. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628, 630-31 (Minn.
2013).
33. See generally infra Part IV.B-C (hypothesizing that even water may be
considered a "pollutant" under the minority interpretation).
34. See infra Part IV.C.
35. 22 WEIMER ETAL., supra note 17.
36. See 831 N.W.2d at 631-32; infra Part III.A.
37. Compare Scottsdale Indem. Co. v. Vill. of Crestwood, 673 F.3d 715, 717
(7th Cir. 2012) (applying the majority rule and holding that the claims against the
village fell within the scope of the pollution exclusion clause at issue), with Wolters,
831 N.W.2d at 642-43 (applying the minority rule and holding that carbon
monoxide released indoors constituted a pollutant within the meaning of the
policy's exclusion clause); see also Stempel, supra note 22, at 7.
38. See, e.g., American States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 75 (11. 1997)
6
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ambiguity is present anywhere that two or more reasonable
interpretations exist; any ambiguities are to be construed in favor
of the insured; 0 and coverage should be found where a reasonable
insured would expect to be covered.4'
The last rule is, in essence, a rule based on common sense. A
contract is a mutual agreement between two or more parties.42
Where an insurer and an insured disagree upon the applicability of
an exclusion, or on any other portion of the contract, there is a
gap.4 ' Employing the first two rules, it must then be found that
there is an ambiguity, and that ambiguity must be resolved in favor•41
of the insured.
The importance of construing insurance contracts according
to what a reasonable insured would expect them to mean is clear to
any casual observer. Insurers write the contracts; they often do so
with their own team of attorneys or by following the lead of the
45Insurance Service Office. The insured, on the other hand, very
rarely has such resources at her disposal.46 She must read the
contract as a layperson, and it is patently unreasonable to expect
that any insured reach the same conclusions as professionals who
spend their careers entertaining the broad potential of seemingly
everyday language.
The court purported to appl y the standard rules of contract
interpretation in deciding Wolters. This was not really the case; it
reached a result that is contrary to a true application of the rules,"
and it entirely disregarded the standard of the reasonable insured. 9
(applying the majority rule); Wolters, 831 N.W. 2d at 636 (applying the minority
rule).
39. See cases cited supra note 38.
40. See cases cited supra note 38.
41. See cases cited supra note 38.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981).
43. See id.
44. See cases cited supra note 38.
45. Bick &Youngblood, supra note 3, at 123.
46. As illustrated by the great deal of litigation that has arisen from absolute
pollution exclusions, it is clear that the insured often expect coverage following
certain incidents. See infra Part IV. Despite this apparent lack of mutual agreement,
insurers continue to bring lawsuits to advance the majority interpretation. See infra
Part I.D; see also Catalano, supra note 1.
47. 831 N.W.2d 628, 636-37 (Minn. 2013).
48. See infra Part IV.
49. See infra Part IV.D.
[Vol. 41:41534
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C. Minority Rule: A Broad Interpretation
In Minnesota, the courts have been considering the meaning
of "pollutant" within the context of absolute pollution exclusions
for nearly three decades) In League of Minnesota Insurance Trust v.
City of Coon Rapids, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that an
absolute pollution exclusion precluded coverage for injuries caused
by the release of carbon dioxide inside an ice arena. 1 This holding,
as the minority rule so often does, took the insured by surprise and
solely benefitted the insurer.52
League of Minnesota Insurance Trust also abandoned the notion
that absolute pollution exclusions should only be applied to
50. E.g., Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495, 497-
500 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), overruled by Bd. of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517
N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1994).
51. 446 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). In pertinent part, the
pollution exclusion stated:
This policy does not apply to:
(1) "Bodily Injury" or "Property Damage" arising out of the actual
alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
pollutants:
(a) at or from premises you own, rent or occupy;
(d) at or from any site or location on which you or any contractors or
subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are
performing operations:
(i) to test for, monitor, clean up, removal, contain, treat, detoxify or
neutralize the pollutants, or
(ii) if the pollutants are brought on or to the site or location by or for
you.
(2) Any loss, cost or expense arising out of any governmental direction
or request that you test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat,
detoxify or neutralize pollutants.
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including asbestos, smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids,
alkalis, chemicals and waste materials. Waste material includes material
which are intended to be or have been recycled, reconditioned, or
reclaimed.
Id. at 420.
52. See id. The contract language at issue in League of Minnesota was broad
enough that nearly any substance could be considered a "pollutant," and the
insured was almost certainly surprised to learn that it excluded coverage for harm
caused while performing routine ice maintenance at an arena. See supra text
accompanying note 51.
8
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traditional environmental pollutants. In contrast to substances
like carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide, traditional
environmental pollutants require an extended period of time to
cause substantial harms. 54 Perhaps more significantly, mitigating
those harms requires expansive efforts, large expenditures, and
substantially more time than it takes to air out an arena.55
In Board of Regents v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, the
Minnesota Supreme Court decided the same asbestos case under
two different pollution exclusions and came to two different
56conclusions. While such a result does, without more detail, seem
to make sense, it once again provided a benefit to the insurer while
defeating another essential purpose of insurance: protection
against unexpected harm caused by substances previously thought
to be beneficial.
Board of Regents also reiterated the court's earlier abandonment
of the reasonable expectations doctrine under certain conditions.57
Essentially, the court held that the doctrine is only applicable
where an exclusion is not clearly identified as such in the5s
contract. This holding was flawed in that these cases do not
53. See League of Minn., 446 N.W.2d at 421-22.
54. See infra Part IV.B.
55. See League of Minn., 446 N.W.2d at 421.
56. 517 N.W.2d 888, 890-94 (Minn. 1994). Over a period of years, the
University of Minnesota had fireproofing materials containing asbestos installed in
some of its buildings. Id. at 889. Over the subsequent two decades, the materials
contaminated the indoor air, and the Board of Regents then sued multiple parties
for the cost of removing the asbestos. Id. The first policy contained a qualified
pollution exclusion that barred coverage for pollutant-caused damage "into or
upon land, the atmosphere, or any watercourse or body of water" but restored
coverage where the pollutant "discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden
and accidental." Id. at 890. The second policy contained a pollution exclusion that
barred coverage for pollutant-caused damage "of land, water, air, or real or
personal property" and did not contain the exclusion exemption found in the first
policy. Id. at 893-94. The first policy, which restored coverage in the event of
"sudden and accidental" damage caused by pollutants, was found to cover the
removal cost of asbestos. Id. at 891-92. The second policy, which did not restore
coverage in the event of an abrupt accident and used the word "air" instead of
"atmosphere," was found to not cover the removal cost of asbestos. Id. at 893-94.
57. Id. at 891.
58. Id. ("In the comprehensive general liability policy involved in this case,
the pollution exclusion is plainly designated as such; consequently, the wording of
the exclusion should be construed, if a claim of ambiguity is raised, in accordance
with the usual rules of interpretation governing insurance contracts. The
reasonable expectation test is not a license to ignore the pollution exclusion in
1536 [Vol. 41:4
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revolve around such a simple question as whether the exclusion is
labeled or not.5 'j Rather, they revolve around the definition and
applicability of the words within the exclusion.
c
The deciding question in such litigation should not be
whether the insured was able to find the exclusion within the
policy; it should be whether the insured could have reasonably
expected the exclusion to bar coverage under the particular facts of
the case.6' Contrary to the question asked in Board of Regents and
subsequent cases,6 - this question accounts for at least two of the
other basic tenets of contract interpretation as well-that words in
the contract are to be defined according to their plain and
ordinary meaning, and any ambiguity is to be strictly construed
against the authoring party.
In Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Hanson,
64 the pollution
exclusion in a landlord's commercial liability policy was found to
bar coverage for harm done to a child by the ingestion of lead
paint.65 Once again, the insurance industry's affinity for stretching
language resulted in cost savings for one party and uncompensated
this case nor to rewrite the exclusion solely to conform to a result that the insured
might prefer.").
59. See generally Bick & Youngblood, supra note 3 (examining the questions
upon which cases involving absolute pollution exclusions rest).
60. See id.
61. See infra Part IV.D.
62. 517 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Minn. 1994) (determining that the reasonable
expectations doctrine is defeated when pollution exclusions are demarcated as
such).
63. See cases cited supra note 38.
64. 588 N.W.2d 777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
65. Id. at 782. The policy used the word "atmosphere" as one of the locations
for which pollutant release was not covered, and it did not restore coverage in the
event of an accident. Id. at 778 n.1. More fully, the exclusion barred coverage for
the "discharge, release, escape, seepage, migration or dispersal of pollutants at or
from any premises owned by an insured. The policy defined pollutant as any solid,
liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, liquids, gases and waste." Id. at 778 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Given the circumstances of the case, which-although
accorded limited space in the court's opinion-almost certainly involved the
toddler eating paint chips, it is difficult to see how a reasonable insured would
consider the actions of a child, no doubt predictable through actuary science, to
constitute "dispersal of pollutants." Id.; see also infra Part IV.B (describing yet
another example, albeit hypothetical, that may very well now be barred coverage
despite common sense dictating a contrary conclusion).
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss4/8
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
harm to the other.6 6 This is not what any court intends when it
becomes mired in contract interpretation, but it is a consequence
of common sense being removed from complex legal doctrine.
As the next section demonstrates, the current trajectory of the
Minnesota courts is not the only option. 7 Other courts have
interpreted absolute pollution exclusions concurrently with
Minnesota, and most have applied the exclusions much more
narrowly than Minnesota has.
D. Majority Rule: A Narrow Interpretation
The majority of courts in the United States require that
pollution exclusions remain faithful to the insurers' original intent
and, more importantly, to the reasonable expectations of those
who purchase the policies. 68 The case law incorporating this
approach is voluminous and comes from every region of the
country,6 9 but the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals provides
particularly well-stated examples.
In a departure from the normal circumstances in which an
insurer engages in litigation against its own insured, West Bend
Mutual Insurance Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.7" involved
litigation between different insurers.' West Bend filed an action
against Federated Mutual Insurance Company (as well as Fidelity
and another insurer) for refusing to defend and indemnify a
mutual insured against claims resulting from leakage of a
commercial gasoline tank into a surrounding residential area.2
In this case, the insured knew of the pollution for several73
years. During that time, the insured maintained commercial
66. See Hanson, 588 N.W.2d at 778.
67. See infra Part II.D (noting thatJudge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals had proposed a new, and eminently reasonable, standard for
application of absolute pollution exclusions given both the changes in policy
language over time and the standard of the reasonable insured).
68. See Bick & Youngblood, supra note 3, at 133-36 (noting that, in multiple
instances, courts found that the logical meaning of 'pollutant' did not include
indoor pollutants).
69. See generally Catalano, supra note 1 (compiling cases concerning pollution
exclusions).
70. 598 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2010).
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general liability policies with a succession of different insurance
companies, which eventually led to the dispute between insurers.74
A class action suit was brought by a number of area residents.75
They alleged both property damage and bodily injury as a result of
the release of gasoline into the area's groundwater. West Bend
paid out $4,000,000 to settle the case. For its part, Federated
refused to either defend or indemnify the insured, and West Bend
filed suit against Federated in order to recoup at least a portion of
the settlement expense.79
To the presumable chagrin of West Bend, but in compliance
with the well-reasoned majority rule, 0 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the absolute pollution exclusion in the
Federated policy barred coverage for harms caused by gasoline."'
Just as in Minnesota cases,s2 the policy was analyzed as a whole
rather than in parts, and words were taken to have their "ordinary
meaning. 8 ' The court neither required nor expected that the
insured be fluent in the technical language employed by the
insurer-drafter in order to understand the policy. In a similar
spirit, the court noted that under the standard employed, any
ambiguity found within the policy terms would be strictly
interpreted against the insurer.
The policy at issue was held to be unambiguous under the factsP86y
of the case. It explicitly barred coverage for harms caused by
gasoline. 7 The policy also defined "pollutant" broadly as "any solid,
74. Id. at 919-20.





80. See id. at 923-24. Although the court did not explicitly refer to the
"majority rule," it interpreted the pollution exclusion narrowly and found the
policy to be "sufficiently explicit" for the insured to be aware that damage caused
by gasoline leakage would not be covered. Id.
81. Id. at 919.
82. See supra Part II.C.
83. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d at 921 (applying Indiana law).
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 922.
87. The terms of the policy stated as follows:
(1) "Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the actual,
alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release
12
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liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.""" As
will be shown, the language in this policy was quite similar to the• • 89
language at issue in Wolters. But, given the nature of both the
substance and the harm, it was proper in this instance for the court
to hold that coverage was barred.
The fact that the pollutant was released directly into the
ground, rather than into the interior of a structure, 90 only
strengthens the applicability of the exclusion in this case. The
damage was widespread: the pollutant went well beyond the
boundaries of the insured property and caused property damage
and bodily injury to families outside of the policy coverage.Although not discussed by the court, it is also relevant that the
or escape of "pollutants":
(f) At or from any tank, piping, pumps or dispensers at premises, sites
or locations in addition to those described in subparagraphs (a), (b),
(d) or (e), which are or were at any time owned, leased, installed,
removed, tested, repaired or filled by or on behalf of any insured,
wherever located (except at residences primarily used for dwelling
purposes) which contain, transport or dispense or are designed to
contain, transport or dispense:
(i) motor fuels;
(ii) kerosene;
(iii) lubricants or other operating fluids which are needed to perform
the normal electrical, hydraulic or mechanical functions necessary for
the operation of any "auto," "mobile equipment," watercraft or aircraft;
or
(iv) waste lubricants or other operating fluids which are or were
needed to perform the normal, electrical, hydraulic or mechanical
functions necessary for the operation of any "auto," "mobile
equipment, [" watercraft or aircraft;
including, but not limited to, their constituent parts and other irritants
or contaminants found therein ...
Motor fuels means petroleum or a petroleum-based substance that is
typically used in the operation of a motor or engine, including but not
limited to gasoline, aviation fuel, number one or number two diesel
fuel, or any grade of gasohol.
Id. at 920-21.
88. Id. at 921.
89. See infra Part III.C.
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damage took several years to accrue. 92 This further serves to bring
gasoline within the realm of a traditional environmental
pollutant,93 as any individual minimally versed in environmental
matters knows that such harms do not often occur quickly.94
In another case from the Seventh Circuit, Scottsdale Indemnity
Co. v. Village of Crestwood,95 the court once again held the harm at
issue to be barred from coverage by the pollution exclusion.96
Similar to the facts in West Bend,97 the village government knew that
the well water being consumed by residents contained
contaminants, and the harms caused by these contaminants
accrued over the course of multiple years. The court's rationale
largely mimicked that employed in West Bend, 99 but the case is
particularly notable in that Judge Richard Posner explicitly
addressed the overly broad definition of "pollutant" inherent in the
minority interpretation of absolute pollution exclusions.' 0
Judge Posner noted,
There is no doubt that perc is a "contaminant" within the
meaning of the policies; and the tort plaintiffs are
92. Id. at 919-20.
93. See id.
94. Notable exceptions to this general rule include environmental disasters
such as the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, which happened quite
quickly. Such instances, however, are precisely the reason that insurers shifted
from the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusions to "absolute" pollution
exclusions. See generally supra Part II.A (examining the development of pollution
exclusions since the 1970s). Holding that "absolute" pollution exclusions bar
coverage for damage that accrues over an extended period of time (as opposed to
the court's "plain-meaning" approach in Wolters) would generally do justice to the
intent of the insurer while still paying heed to the standard of the reasonable
insured. See infra Part LV.B-C. There is substantial authority that would allow a
rational and well-founded exception to the standard supported by this note so as
to bar coverage for such incidences as the Deepwater Horizon explosion. Bick &
Youngblood, supra note 3; see infra Part IV.C (advancing Judge Posner's proposed
standard of "pollution harms as ordinarily understood").
95. 673 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2012). The facts of this case were particularly
fitting to the application of the pollution exclusion: the Village of Crestwood not
only continued using the well water for decades after discovery of the pollutant,
but village officials also failed to comply with promises made to Illinois officials
that the well would be used only in cases of emergency. Id. at 716.
96. Id. at 721 (applying Illinois law).
97. 598 F.3d at 919-21.
98. Crestwood, 673 F.3d at 716.
99. 598 F.3d at 921-26.
100. Crestwood, 673 F.3d at 716-19.
14
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complaining about its "dispersal" by the Village from the
contaminated well to their homes via the system of water
mains that connects the well to the homes. The problem
with stopping there and affirming the district court in one
sentence is that a literal reading of the pollution exclusion
would exclude coverage for acts remote from the ordinary
understanding of pollution harms and unrelated to the concerns
that gave rise to the exclusion. "'
The two foregoing sentences succinctly illustrate the flaw in
the minority view. Applying the pollution exclusion to certain
events is, in no way, giving words their plain and ordinary
meaning. '"
III. MIDWEST FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY V. WOLTERS
A. Factual Background
In 2007, appellant Charles E. Bartz decided to do a
quintessentially Minnesotan thing: build a secluded cabin in the
woods. 10 4 In pursuance of this dream, he hired respondent Michael
D. Wolters to act as general contractor for the cabin's
construction. 105
One of the specifications for Mr. Bartz's cabin was that the
furnace be equipped to accept propane fuel. 16 Mr. Wolters
maintained that he instructed his heating subcontractor of this
necessity, but it is clear that Mr. Wolters himself ultimately installed
a furnace equipped solely for natural gas.l10 If this had been
noticed, it would not have been an insurmountable mistake. The
problem could have been fixed by installing a different size burner
in the same furnace.0 " Nonetheless, whether he was aware of the
101. Id. at 716-17 (emphasis added).
102. See id.; see also infra Part IV.
103. See infra Part V.





108. See Appellants' Reply Brief at 1, Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628 (No. All-181),
2012 WL 10206155, at *1 ("There is something inherently wrong with denying
liability coverage to an insured homebuilder under a pollution exclusion, when
the builder merely forgot to plug-in the carbon monoxide detector and failed to
1542 [Vol. 41:4
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furnace's configuration or not, Mr. Wolters personally connected
the natural gas furnace to a propane fuel source. 9 Additionally,
the carbon monoxide detectors in the home were not connected to
the AC power source and contained batteries that had been
installed backwards."0 This was the state of affairs when Mr. Bartz
brought his friend Catherine M. Brewster for a visit.
In the early morning hours of December 29, 2007, Ms.
Brewster awoke to find Mr. Bartz unresponsive.I" Feeling dizzy and
nauseous, she attempted to get fresh air into the house by opening
a back door, but hit her head on the sliding glass door. 112 She fell to
the ground with a deep cut on her face.' '3 Eventually she managed
to get to the kitchen, where she found a phone 
and dialed 911.'
4
Thankfully, emergency crews arrived in time to assist both Ms.
Brewster and Mr. Bartz.' '5 The two survived their bouts of carbon
monoxide p6oisoning and filed suit against Mr. Wolters for
negligence.
B. Procedural Background
Mr. Wolters invoked his insurance policy from Midwest Family
Mutual Insurance Company (Midwest), no doubt reasoning that
these circumstances are exactly why contractors purchase liability
insurance. Midwest sought a declaratory judgment that the policy's
"absolute pollution exclusion" barred coverage under these
circumstances." s The district court denied the motion and
ultimately "entered final judgment against Midwest," holding "that
Midwest had a duty to defend or indemnify [Mr.] Wolters" under
the policy." '
exchange a large burner orifice in the radiant heat boiler with a smaller one.").
109. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 631.
110. Id. Mr. Wolters testified that he had personally tested the detectors after






116. Id. at 632.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id. When Midwest moved for summary judgment earlier in the case,
"[t]he district court denied Midwest's motion, holding that it would be
'inappropriate to rule as a matter of law' that the 'absolute pollution exclusion
16
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On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed,12°
holding that under the "'non-technical, plain-meaning approach"'
used in Minnesota to interpret pollution exclusions, "carbon
monoxide constitutes a pollutant."'121 Mr. Wolters appealed the
decision and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed.
122
At this juncture, the cases involving Mr. Bartz and Ms. Brewster
were still ongoing. 12 Mr. Wolters had the unfortunate experience
of being mired in several different lawsuits at once; 12 one of these
lawsuits was against a company with assumedly disproportionate
125
resources to his own. It takes no stretch of the imagination to
envision how quickly Mr. Wolters's profits from the construction of
the Bartz cabin would have dissipated in the face of this extensive
litigation.
Although no more relevant to this Note's analysis than it was to
the court's ruling, it must be acknowledged that, from a practical
standpoint, it may not be such a travesty if Mr. Wolters's company
has since gone out of business. According to court records, there
have been claims filed against his company on a number of• 126
occasions. Each of these claims, including those of Mr. Bartz and• • 127
Ms. Brewster, eventually settled without trial. Furthermore, the
repeated claims may partly explain why it is that Midwest invested
so many resources in litigating against its own insured. The
unfortunate result, however, is that having now won such a battle,
bars coverage under the facts in this case,' since [Mr.] Wolters did not 'cause any
environmental pollution."' Id. (quoting the district court).
120. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, No. Al1-181, 2011 WL 3654498,
at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2011).
121. Id. at *3 (quoting Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 588 N.W.2d 777, 779
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999)).
122. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 639; see infra Part III.C.
123. See Brewster v. Wolters, No. 04-CV-10-2492 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013)
(notice of filing of order and entry of judgment); Bartz v. Wolters, No. 04-CV-1I1-
375 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013) (notice of filing of order and entry of
judgment).
124. See Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628; cases cited infra note 126.
125. Ron Boyd, MEM Announces 2011 Results and Plans for 2012, MIDWEST
FAMILY MUT. INS. CO. (Feb. 11, 2012, 1:02 PM), https://midwestfamily.com/news
.php?detail=589 (indicating that the company exceeded $100 million in invested
assets in 2011).
126. See, e.g., Melchert v. Wolters, No. 66-S9-02-000389 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 2,
2003) (converted disposition, settled); Bardal v. Precision Builders, No. 66-CX-98-
000458 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 10, 1998) (converted disposition, closed).
127. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 126.
1544 [Vol. 41:4
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Midwest and every other Minnesota insurer have a valid reason to
believe that the absolute pollution exclusion may be successfully
invoked when actuary science fails to protect the bottom line.
C. The Court's Analysis and Holding
Affirming the court of appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that "carbon monoxide released from a negligently installed
boiler is a 'pollutant' that is subject to the absolute pollution
exclusion of the [general liability insurance] policy" 
at issue. 28
Despite extensive case law that advances a contrary view,
129 the
court claimed that this is the only logical conclusion to be reached
under the standard rules of contract interpretation."
°
The rules that the court purported to apply are a direct
replication of those applied by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, thus buttressing the contention that they are indeed
"standard." Here, however, the court reached an entirely different
result than that which would be reached in the majority of this
nation's jurisdictions applying those same rules.' The rules, as
presented by the Minnesota Supreme Court, are as follows:
Insurance contracts are "to be interpreted according to both 'plain,
ordinary sense' and 'what a reasonable person in the position of
the insured would have understood the words to mean." 32 The
intent of both parties is to be paid heed to, and the policy must be
interpreted as a whole rather than part-by-part."l Finally, any
ambiguities, denoted by the possibility of two or more reasonable
interpretations, 13are to be "resolved in favor of the insured.'
3 5
The Midwest policy defined "pollutant" as "any solid, liquid,
gaseous, thermal, electrical emission (visible or invisible) or sound
128. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 638.
129. See cases cited supra note 38.
130. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 636.
131. See supra Part IID.
132. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 636 (quoting Canadian Universal Ins. Co. v. Fire
Watch, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Minn. 1977))(citing Farmers Home Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Lill, 332 N.W.2d 635,637 (Minn. 1983)).
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing Medica, Inc. v. At. Mut. Ins. Co., 566 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn.
1997)).
135. Id. (quoting Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn.
1979)).
18
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emission pollutant, irritant or contaminant."1 6 As the court noted,
the dictionary defines carbon monoxide as "a colorless odorless
very toxic gas,' ' 7 and it most certainly caused irritation to Ms.
Brewster and Mr. Bartz.13 Therefore, carbon monoxide is a gaseous
substance that causes irritation, and accordingly, the substance is a
pollutant as defined by the policy.139
As to the contention that it is ambiguous whether the policy
applies to indoor pollution as well as outdoor pollution, the court
turned to precedent. The Midwest policy contained neither the
word "atmosphere" nor the word "air,' 4' and was therefore found
to be unambiguous and deserving the broadest possible
interpretation 14 -or at least, the broadest interpretation yet
applied in Minnesota. 1
3
In addition to holding that recovery for damages caused by the
indoor release of carbon monoxide due to a negligently installed
boiler is barred by the pollution exclusion, the court also
considered the "reasonable expectations" doctrine.44 This doctrine
instructs that where an exclusion is not easily recognizable as a
limit on coverage, "the insured should be held only to reasonable
knowledge of the literal terms and conditions.""' Having found this
doctrine to be inapplicable to the Midwest policy,46 the court ruled
in favor of Midwest.
136. Id. at 641. Note that this definition is substantially similar to that at issue
in West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 598 F.3d 918, 921-22, 925 (7th
Cir. 2010), discussed supra Part lI.D.
137. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 637 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 171 (10th ed. 2001)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 638 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888,
891-93 (Minn. 1994)).
141. Id. at 631-32.
142. Id. at 636-37; see also Medica, Inc. v. At. Mut. Ins. Co., 566 N.W.2d 74, 77
(Minn. 1997). The court's finding in Wolters illustrates the incentive that insurers
have to encourage expansion of pollution exclusions, whether such
encouragement comes in the form of further litigation or minor policy-language
changes which only the most aware of the insured would notice. 831 N.W.2d at
636-37.
143. See supra Part II.C.
144. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 638-39.
145. Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278
(Minn. 1985).
146. The "reasonable expectations" doctrine is distinct from the "reasonable
1546 [Vol. 41:4
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IV. THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF THE COURT'S HOLDING
This Note is concerned with three issues arising from the
Wolters decision. Although the issues will be addressed separately,
each is intertwined with the others in the sense that they will
present sometimes insurmountable obstacles to the continuance of
certain businesses.
The first issue involves an area of law that has seen a great deal
of litigation and a distinct jurisdictional splitl4S: the Wolters court
determined that there was no ambiguity in the absolute pollution
exclusion. 49 As the dissent noted, this finding is difficult to
rationalize.
15 0
The second issue is that the court has allowed pollution
exclusions to expand far beyond their original purpose.Sr Perhaps
some expansion was in order given the modified language of the
exclusions, 15'2 but the extent to which Wolters expanded it will
undoubtedly result in even more litigation. This will almost
certainly be litigation that mires insured businesses in multiple
lawsuits at a time, including legal disputes with their own
insurers.153
The third issue is that Wolters contradicted the longstanding
notion that insurance contracts are to be interpreted "according to
what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have
insured standard." The former pertains primarily to instances in which the insured
could not be reasonably expected to even know of the policy term in question,
rather than when an exclusion is clearly marked as it was in Wolters. 831 N.W.2d at
634. The latter pertains to all insurance contracts, in that they are to be
interpreted in light of what a reasonable person in the position of the insured
would take the policy to mean. Id. at 642 n.2 (Paul Anderson,J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 639 (majority opinion).
148. Catalano, supra note 1; see supra Part III.A-B.
149. 831 N.W.2d at 638.
150. Id. at 642-43 (Paul Anderson, J., dissenting) ("I find it difficult to
understand how the majority can conclude that the policy is unambiguous on the
facts of this case.").
151. As demonstrated by Board of Regents v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, in
which two different policies were at issue, the insurance industry has made minor
changes to the wording of the pollution exclusions over the years. 517 N.W.2d 888
(Minn. 1994). This change of wording is assumed to be purposeful, but it is not
certain that it was meant to preclude coverage of all incidents involving substances
within the policy definition of "pollutants" when released indoors. Id.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 123.
20
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understood the words to mean. ' '154 This error exacerbates the
inherent disparities in bargaining power between insurers and their
customers, thus rendering the relationships more inequitable.
A. Ambiguity of the Absolute Pollution Exclusion
In contract law, a term is ambiguous "if it is susceptible to two
or more reasonable interpretations." 15 As previously discussed,
pollution exclusions have been the subject of an inordinate
number of cases.15 Different jurisdictions have decided the
question of ambiguity in different ways, with the majority findin
more than one reasonable interpretation of the word "pollutant.''
Given the split of authority on this matter, inherent in the
court's finding that no ambiguity exists is the proposition that a
majority of the courts in the country have adopted an unreasonable
interpretation. 1 5  When judges, who are trained in the
interpretation of language, can come to differing conclusions as to
the meaning of a term or word, it seems evident that such a term or
word should be deemed ambiguous. If both the Minnesota
Supreme Court's interpretation and, for example, the Illinois
Supreme Court's interpretation are reasonable, then ambiguity
should be found. 1  Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
noted precisely that in previous cases.16
Furthermore, the pollution exclusion involved in Wolters is
facially ambiguous. It defines pollutant as "any solid, liquid,
gaseous, thermal, electrical emission (visible or invisible) or sound
emission pollutant, irritant or contaminant."' 6 Is this to suggest
that irritation or contamination caused by any matter-whatever its
154. Canadian Universal Ins. Co. v. Fire Watch, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 570, 572
(Minn. 1977) (citing Petronzio v. Brayda, 350 A.2d 256, 261 (NJ. 1975)).
155. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 636.
156. See Catalano, supra note 1, § 2.
157. See id. passim; see also Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 635.
158. See Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 642 (Paul Anderson,J., dissenting).
159. Compare Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 73 (Il1. 1997)
(holding that carbon monoxide was not subject to the pollutant exclusion), with
Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 637 (majority opinion) (holding that carbon monoxide was
subject to the pollutant exclusion).
160. See, e.g., Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 643 (Paul Anderson, J. dissenting) (citing
Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 180 (Minn.
1990) (noting that an inherent ambiguity is present when there is "sharp division"
of interpretations in other jurisdictions)).
161. Id. at 632 (majority opinion).
1548 [Vol. 41:4
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form-falls within the exclusion? Such an interpretation, although
certainly reasonable under the plain-meaning approach, has the
potential effect of negating coverage for virtually all activities that
take place on a construction site.' 62 Given that the primary
incentive for contractors to purchase commercial general liability
policies is to protect themselves from the financial harms of making
a mistake, the broad interpretation employed by the majority
renders the policies largely useless. Such a result suggests
ambiguity. 6 '
The Minnesota Supreme Court has erred by holding that there
is no ambiguity in a clause that has resulted in extensive litigation
and a jurisdictional split. 6' This holding suggests that the majority
of courts in this nation are inherently unreasonable.
Furthermore, the logical ramification of Wolters may be to bar
coverage in circumstances where different parts of the policy
suggest otherwise.' 66 Under the rules of interpretation that the
court purported to use,"37 this also supports a finding of ambiguity.
B. Undue Expansion of the Absolute Pollution Exclusion
The purpose of a pollution exclusion is to bar insurance
coverage for traditional environmental pollution.16 First in Board of
Regents,169 and now to a greater extent in Wolters,17 the court has
eliminated this purpose. Of course, some expansion of the
exclusion may be in order. The language of the standard absolute
pollution exclusion has changed over the years."' This reflects
162. Scottsdale Indem. Co. v. Vill. of Crestwood, 673 F.3d 715, 716-17 (7th
Cir. 2012) ("[T]he problem ... is that a literal reading of the pollution exclusion
would exclude coverage for acts remote from the ordinary understanding of
pollution harms and unrelated to the concerns that gave rise to the exclusion.").
163. 22 WEIMER ET AL., supra note 17, § 2:3 (explaining that "courts are
reluctant" to adopt an interpretation "that would forfeit expected policy
benefits").
164. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 639.
165. See id. at 643 (Paul Anderson,J., dissenting).
166. See infra Part 1V.B.
167. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 636.
168. See Bick & Youngblood, supra note 3, at 126-29 (discussing cases that
distinguish man-made pollution from natural environment pollution).
169. Bd. of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1994).
170. 831 N.W.2d at 639.
171. Id.
172. See Bd. of Regents, 517 N.W.2d 888; see also Bick & Youngblood, supra note
22
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intent on the part of insurers to change the reach of the
exclusion. However, the extent of the interpretive latitude now
granted is uncalled for. It raises countless questions, and will
undoubtedly result in even more litigation.
Consider an example likely to arise in Minnesota: water
damage caused by ice dam removal.' The removal of ice dams
often involves the use of hot water emitted from a pressure sprayer
onto the roof of a building. Occasionally, the combination of hot
water, high pressure, frigid temperatures, and an already-leaking
roof results in water damage to the interior of the building.
A responsible contractor engaged in such work would hold a
commercial general liability policy to protect herself and her
customers from potential damage. Yet, water is plainly a "liquid,"
and in this example, it has plainly been subject to "discharge" in
175
connection with the contractor's work 7. Thus, interior water
damage caused by ice dam removal arguably fits into the "non-
technical, plain-meaning" of the absolute pollution exclusion. 7 6 On
the other hand, the risk of precisely this type of damage may be the
principal reason for the insured to buy the policy. Thus, if the
pollution exclusion does apply to such damage, the policy may be
illusory.177 The potential resulting litigation is the sort that ruins
small businesses in a matter of weeks. To start, the owner of the
damaged property sues the service-providing company.' 8 The
contractor then turns the suit over to her insurance company,
expecting that her liability policy will require the insurer to defend
and indemnify her.7 9 In an unexpected twist, the insurer then files
suit against the contractor in order to determine liability."'
3, at 123-25.
173. See generally Bick & Youngblood, supra note 3 (discussing the changes in
language within pollution exclusions and potential reasons for them).
174. The author worked for a Minnesota construction company specializing in
seamless gutters and ice dam removal for eight years. All comments on the ice
dam removal process stem from this experience.
175. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 631-32.
176. Id. at 633-34.
177. 22 WEIMER ET AL., supra note 17, § 2:5 (explaining that "insurance
contracts are construed so as not to be a delusion to the insured").
178. See generally Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 632 (discussing the litigation of the
parties).
179. See 22 WEIMER ET AL., supra note 17, § 3.2 (discussing indemnification and
expectations).
180. See Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 632.
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This may happen no matter what the insurer originally
intended the absolute pollution exclusion to mean. To the insurer,
winning one suit inures potential savings in the hundreds of
thousands or perhaps even millions of dollars. These are not
savings that result from sound business planning and ingenuity;
these are savings that result from the inherent disparities in
bargaining power and legal funds between the insurer and the
insured. The Minnesota Supreme Court now gives the insurer
sound reason to hope those disparities will broaden even further.'8 '
To the contractor, fighting such a suit against her well-heeled
insurer may lead to speedy bankruptcy. Even if the insured prevails,
she has now been forced to cover the extensive costs of litigation.
In addition, she has had to substitute revenue-generating time on
rooftops for time spent in courtrooms and law offices. Perhaps she
may recoup these expenses when the appeals process has finally
been exhausted, but she will never regain the lost customers. She
will also return to work, assuming she still owns the pressure
sprayer and has been able to retain her employees, with newly
acquired fears about the risks of doing her job well. She is already
trudging around on icy rooftops; must she also fear being mired in
another needless lawsuit?
C. A Suggested Alternative
The Wolters court, in a counterintuitive move, 82 noted that,
"Appellants do not propose a definition of 'traditional
environmental pollution' except to assure our court that such a
phrase would not include carbon monoxide.' 8, 3 Given the
substantial consideration allotted to this issue by other
jurisdictions, 84 the fact that these particular litigants had not
181. See id. at 638-39.
182. See Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, No. Al1-181, 2011 WL
3654498, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2011), affd, 831 N.W.2d 628 ("The district
court concluded that the absolute pollution exclusion should be limited to
traditional environmental pollutants, reasoning that Minnesota courts' past
interpretations of the exclusion to include interior contamination from ordinary
negligence is against public policy. Although the concerns expressed by
respondents and the district court appear valid, precedent compels an
interpretation of the pollution exclusion to include interior pollutants, and any
policy-based expansion of that exclusion is beyond our authority.").
183. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 638.
184. See generally Catalano, supra note 1 (providing a comprehensive list of the
24
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advanced a new definition to account for the modified policy
language lends little credence to the court's decision to stick with
the old definition.
Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, has considered the difficulty of syncing "traditional
environmental pollution" with the modified policy language.1 5 He
suggests that this is not necessary, and advances an entirely new
definition: "[P]ollution harms as ordinarily understood." 8' This
definition would "exclude the case of the leaking furnace."' Few
laypeople would ever consider an event that requires little more of
a solution than opening the windows to be a harm caused by
pollution." s Judge Posner's definition would also exclude the case
of water damage caused by ice dam removal. After all, under what
ordinary understanding would water, especially when serving a
useful purpose, constitute a "pollutant?"'89
While barring application of the exclusion to cases such as
negligently installed furnaces and water damage, the "pollution
harms as ordinarily understood" definition also accounts for the
obvious intent of the insurance industry to not be strictly held to
the traditional environmental pollution standard. 90 As previously
discussed, courts have distinguished policies that limit the
exclusion to pollution of "the atmosphere" and those that apply to
pollution of the "air" or contain no such language.' 9' It is assumed
that insurers did not modify the policy language without reason,
but it is far from clear that the drafters of the new language, not to
many cases involving pollution exclusions).




188. See Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 108, at 1; In an Emergency, CO BE
ALARMED, http://www.co-bealarmed.co.uk/in-an-emergency/ (last visited Apr. 23,
2015).
189. This example is analogous to one advanced by judge Posner, namely, "If
one commits suicide by breathing in exhaust fumes, is that death by pollution?"
Crestwood, 673 F.3d at 717. Of course, a difference that cannot be ignored is that
"suicide by breathing in exhaust fumes," id., is hardly a useful purpose, whereas
hot water used to remove ice dams very much is.
190. See id.
191. SeeBd. of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1994);
see also Bick & Youngblood, supra note 3, at 123-25.
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mention the individuals who buy the policies, intended such a
broad exclusion as that found in Wollers.' 92
Perhaps the largest advantage of Judge Posner's proposed
definition19 is that it allows for development to occur naturally with
the passage of time, as all sound legal standards should. As science
develops and popular understandings change, courts would be able
to respond without overturning precedent and reinventing the
wheel. It is time that the Minnesota Supreme Court paid heed to
the many courts and scholars who have considered this area of
law, 14 and reached a more appropriate conclusion than that of
Wolters. 1"
D. Abandoning the Standard of the Reasonable Insured
It is a long-standing tenet of Minnesota insurance litigation
that policies and, by extension, policy exclusions, are to be
interpreted in light of "what a reasonable person in the position of
the insured would have understood the [policy] to mean."
1
96 In
Wolters, the court noted that the insured argued for basing the
decision off of this tenet, acknowledged the argument's validity,'
9 7
and then, as the dissent pointed out, entirely ignored it."
200
By ignoring the "reasonable insured" standard, the court
implicitly held that a reasonable person in Wolters's position would
192. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 636 ("Midwest argues that under the plain-
meaning approach to interpreting policy language as set forth in our Board of
Regents decision, carbon monoxide is clearly a pollutant to which the absolute
pollution exclusion applies."). Certainly, attorneys for Midwest argued for the
broad interpretation. Id. This does not mean that the drafters necessarily intended
it, and it definitely does not mean that the insured should have anticipated the
application of the exclusion in such a counterintuitive manner. See Crestwood, 673
F.3d at 717; Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 638.
193. See Crestwood, 673 F.3d at 717.
194. See, e.g., Crestwood, 673 F.3d 715 passim; Stempel, supra note 22, at 58-59.
195. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628.
196. See, e.g., Farmers Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lill, 332 N.W.2d 635, 637 (Minn.
1983) (quoting Canadian Universal Ins. Co. v. Fire Watch, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 570,
572 (Minn. 1977)).
197. 831 N.W.2d at 633-34.
198. Id. at 641 (Paul Anderson,J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 634-36 (majority opinion). The court also noted that the
"reasonable insured" standard is distinct from the "reasonable expectations"
doctrine, but only considered the latter in its analysis. See id.
200. See generally Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628.
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not expect to be covered for the negligent installation of a furnace
and carbon monoxide detectors. ' If that is the court's holding, the
standard may just as well have been abandoned.
Few contractors are trained in the complexities of contract
interpretation and may not be aware of the broad meanings courts
202sometimes attach to common terms. Pollution suggests long-
lasting damage and solutions which take a relatively substantial
amount of time to enact, even if such damage occurs indoors.03
Mitigating carbon monoxide discharge requires only that the
windows be opened and that the wrongly installed furnace be
fixed.20 ' A reasonable contractor, even one who made note of the
broad policy definition of "pollutant,, 20 5 could hardly be expected
to foresee the application of the exclusion to such a situation.
201Thus, coverage should be found.
To ignore the reasonable insured standard is to ignore one of
201the most basic tenets of insurance contract interpretation.
Moreover, disregarding this standard exacerbates the disparities in
bargaining power inherent in such contracts and puts insurers in a
position to blindside those who have done the right thing in
securing a policy.
201. See id. at 638-39.
202. See, e.g., Bick & Youngblood, supra note 3, at 120-21.
203. See, e.g., Scottsdale Indem. Co. v. Vill. of Crestwood, 673 F.3d 715, 717
(7th Cir. 2012) (noting that in other cases involving pollution exclusion clauses,
coverage was denied when the harms occurred over a period of years, whereas
coverage was found when the harms could be resolved in a relatively short period
of time); Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d
1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992) (employing several examples of harms caused by
substances which fit the policy definition of "pollutant," but finding that coverage
would exist in instances where the harm caused by the substances occurred quickly
and unexpectedly).
204. See generally Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628; see also In an Emergency, supra note
188.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 196 and 197.
206. See, e.g., Bick & Youngblood, supra note 3, at 133-36 (arguing and
providing support for the proposition that coverage for indoor pollution is not
excluded by the absolute pollution exclusion clause).
207. See Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 636.
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V. CONCLUSION
In the same breath that the court recognized that "there are
serious concerns associated with the breadth of the exclusion,"2 8 it
handed down a ruling209 that raises concerns both rational and
substantial. Holding that there is no ambiguity in a type of contract
210
that has instigated an inordinate amount of litigation °, the court
disagreed with the majority of jurisdictions2 ' and made a ruling
that will result in even more disputes. The expansion of the
pollution exclusion, based in part on the finding of no ambiguity,
212
will likewise result in even more litigation. Furthermore, such
expansion will be detrimental to policyholders, while benefitting
insurers. Policyholders will continue to be surprised that their
coverage is not as expansive as they thought, and insurers will
continue to reap the financial rewards of selling the policies while
not satisfying claims for any careless act which happens to involve a
"pollutant." Finally, when the court ignored the "reasonable
213 214
insured" standard,2 3 it cast aside a basic principle of contract law.
This should not have been done, and it will, along with the
expansion of the exclusion, benefit the party with already greater
bargaining power. The court, in one of the inevitable subsequent
cases, needs to reconsider the holding of Wolters.
208. Id. at 637 ("It is enough for purposes of the present dispute to conclude
that carbon monoxide is a pollutant under the terms of the absolute pollution
exclusion; there are serious concerns associated with the breadth of the exclusion
that we leave for another day, and we do not attempt to define the complete scope
of the term 'pollutant' in the absolute pollution exclusion. Instead, we only
conclude that, based on our holding in Board of Regents, carbon monoxide
qualifies as a pollutant in this case.").
209. Id. at 639.
210. See Catalano, supra note 1.
211. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d at 635.
212. See id. at 639.
213. See id. at 638.
214. See id. at 636.
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